Operation Sindoor – 5 Questions That Follow
May 22, 2025 | Pratirodh Bureau
Army officer Col Sofiya Qureshi addresses a press conference regarding 'Operation Sindoor' in New Delhi
The claims and counterclaims following the Pahalgam terrorist attack and Operation Sindoor have raised several questions that the government is unlikely to address. More significantly, few may even think about asking them. But here’s an attempt at that…
Question 1. What measures did our security agencies take in response to the actionable intelligence indicating a possible threat to Pahalgam?
Between 2 and 22 February 2025, US space tech and geospatial intelligence firm Maxar Technologies observed a significant increase in satellite image requests for Pahalgam, receiving 12 orders for high-resolution images of the area and its strategically sensitive surroundings. Additional requests were made on 12 April, just 10 days prior to the terror strike. At that time, Business Systems International (BSI), a Pakistani geospatial firm, was Maxar’s partner.
Hours after a report by Soumya Pillai in ThePrint was published on 9 May, Maxar terminated its partnership with BSI. Was this an instance of ‘actionable intelligence’ that Indian agencies failed to act upon? Should the surge in demand for satellite images, coupled with the fact that Maxar had a Pakistani partner, have rung alarm bells? Were Indian intelligence agencies aware of this connection? Furthermore, should the prior conviction of BSI founder Obaidullah Syed for illegally exporting nuclear-related technology to Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission have been a cause for concern?
Question 2. Has Pakistan’s recognition of the Trump administration’s mediation in the ceasefire effectively ‘internationalized’ the Kashmir issue, despite India’s more cautious stance?
While India worked to dismiss US President Donald Trump’s assertion of a ‘US-brokered ceasefire,’ Pakistan’s enthusiastic response made it clear why Islamabad was eager to recognize the Trump administration’s involvement in halting military hostilities. With US Secretary of State Marco Rubio offering to facilitate a second round of talks between India and Pakistan at a ‘neutral site,’ and Trump proposing to mediate a solution to the “thousand-year-old Kashmir dispute” (sic), were these diplomatic gestures not signals that Pakistan had effectively reintroduced a third party into the Kashmir dialogue? This reintroduction contradicts the Simla Agreement of 1972, which stipulated that the two neighbors would manage their issues bilaterally.
By openly and repeatedly expressing gratitude to Trump, did Islamabad not position his offer as evidence that the Kashmir issue demands global attention? Is this not a reinforcement of Pakistan’s long-standing strategy to internationalize the issue through platforms like the United Nations, despite India’s consistent opposition? While the long-term impact of Trump’s grandstanding on brokering peace between two ‘nuclear-armed neighbors’ remains uncertain, can Pakistan not be seen as counting this as a diplomatic victory for now?
Question 3. Is India’s readiness for a two-front war, especially against China and Pakistan, genuinely robust? This is crucial considering that the official narrative on the war’s outcomes lacks support from independent assessments.
With a significantly larger defense budget and nearly $700 billion in foreign exchange reserves, does India not hold an economic advantage over Pakistan in sustaining a long-term conflict? However, India’s defense leadership has openly stated that a ‘two-front war’—simultaneous hostilities with both China and Pakistan—is no longer merely a theoretical possibility.
Many experts argue that India’s current force posture, particularly regarding air power, is insufficient for a two-front confrontation. Given the steady supply of Chinese hardware and technology to Pakistan since 2020, along with its open multidimensional support during recent confrontations, does this not make the prospect of a two-front war even more daunting? While Indian leadership continues to express confidence in the country’s preparedness, should independent global analyses that question India’s capacity to decisively engage in a two-front war not be taken seriously?
Question 4. Could it be said that India was outmaneuvered diplomatically?
India’s diplomatic outreach following the Pahalgam attack did not succeed in isolating Pakistan. Despite presenting what it described as clear evidence of Pakistani involvement in the attack, did India manage to secure an explicit condemnation of Pakistan from any major global power or grouping, such as the G7, G20, BRICS, or Quad nations? Even after Operation Sindoor, why did no leading nation publicly endorse India’s military response? While some countries called for restraint and de-escalation, did any unequivocally support India’s right to retaliate?
In contrast, China openly supported Pakistan by providing advanced weapons systems, real-time surveillance data, and intelligence cooperation. At the United Nations, did Beijing not shield Islamabad by collaborating with other nations to soften references to Pakistan-based terror groups during Security Council discussions? Furthermore, did China not block any mention of The Resistance Force (TRF), the group that claimed responsibility for the Pahalgam attack, at the UN sanctions committee?
Additionally, Turkey and Azerbaijan openly sided with Pakistan. In a notable display of solidarity, did Turkey not deploy six military aircraft and a warship to Pakistan, referring to the country as its ‘brother’? To compound India’s diplomatic frustrations, how did Pakistan manage to secure the immediate release of $1 billion in international financial assistance despite mounting evidence of its links to cross-border terrorism?
Question 5. What implications arise from PM Modi’s assertion that India perceives no distinction between terrorists and states that openly support terrorism? How does this perspective influence India’s counter-terrorism strategy?
By wagging its finger at Pakistan, is the Modi government implying that India will automatically treat acts of terror as state-sponsored, which would then warrant a response that India deems appropriate? If we consider the most recent cycle of provocation (Pahalgam) and retaliation (Sindoor), does this signal a message of restraint this time, with the implication that the response could be more severe in the future? Experts have highlighted the futility of addressing terrorism solely through military means—history has shown that this approach is ineffective.
The new doctrine—if it can be called that—may be signaling a zero-tolerance stance towards terror. However, in attempting to establish a new red line, is it possible that the government is misreading the nature of the enemy?
Other experts caution that this policy could leave India vulnerable to the actions of individual terrorists. It is also conceivable that this rhetoric is more about political posturing than a genuine doctrine, aimed at appeasing the more aggressive elements within the ruling party’s support base or enhancing PM Modi’s strongman image ahead of significant state elections.