B’desh’s Yunus’ Chinese Checkers Game Has India On The Edge

The ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 and the establishment of an interim government under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus has changed the dynamics of India-Bangladesh relations. Dhaka under Sheikh Hasina had managed to balance its relationship between New Delhi and Beijing quite adeptly.

However, the foreign and economic policies of the interim government, which last month showed signs of cozying up to Beijing, have pushed the relationship downhill and is adding to India’s neighbourhood worries.

No surprises then that the first state visit undertaken by Yunus was to China from March 26 to 29. It showed a clear preference for Beijing in Dhaka’s foreign policy under the interim government. To make matters worse, Yunus stated that India’s northeast is landlocked and Bangladesh is the “only guardian of the ocean for this entire region.”

While the Indian establishment did not react to Yunus’ China visit, the Bangladeshi leader’s reference to India’s northeast being landlocked and other economic overtures to Beijing would raise New Delhi’s hackles.

From Bangladesh’s perspective, this could open up a huge opportunity. It could become an extension of the Chinese economy — “build, produce, market, bring goods to China and export them to the rest of the world” as Bangladesh’s ambassador to Beijing said. This clearly underscored what the Bangladesh interim government is thinking about its relationship with China and the push for further economic collaborations.

China is already in the process of investing heavily in infrastructure projects in Bangladesh under the aegis of the Belt and Road Development (BRI) initiative. While Hasina was in power, Dhaka was one of BRI’s success stories in South Asia. Yunus’ statement only showed a clear push for further integration with China.

But such moves may further jeopardise Bangladesh’s sovereignty and foreign policy. Bangladesh is keen to start discussions around a formal Free Trade Agreement with China and Beijing’s assertion on a zero tariff policy for Bangladeshi products till 2028 will draw Dhaka towards Beijing’s sphere of influence.

Bangladesh also went out of its way and revisited most of the projects which were granted to India under Hasina, especially the Teesta River development and Mongla port projects.

Yunus’ overtures to China

Under Yunus, it is obvious that Dhaka is keen to have Beijing on board with respect to the Teesta River project. Beijing has even committed around USD 2.1 billion in the form of investments, grants as well as loans for the project. Bangladesh is also keen to invite China for the Mongla Port Facilities Modernisation and Expansion Project, which is aimed at hurting India’s interests.

Yunus’ visit to China has also added to India’s security challenges. Dhaka is said to have invited Beijing to develop a British era airbase at Lalmonirhat, close to India’s Siliguri ‘Chicken’s Neck’ in North Bengal. The work on this is expected to begin in October and a Pakistani company may be appointed as a sub-contractor.

In return, Beijing has promised USD 350 million to develop the China Economic and Industrial Zone in Chittagong, Bangladesh. This, coupled with the growing sale of arms and ammunition by China, will worsen the situation for India. A military base, which may have Chinese personnel so close to the Indian border, will definitely challenge India’s security and infrastructure preparedness in the region.

Given the nature of the India-China boundary dispute, and also the China-Bhutan border differences, this development will lead to deeper militarisation in the region. This will add to the already deteriorating trust between New Delhi and Dhaka and can have far-reaching repercussions.

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bangladesh and China. It has been reported that Bangladesh’s ambassador to Beijing praised China as a “time tested partner” and held up the ties as a “promise for the future” to deepen “economic growth”, trade and investment, education, culture and healthcare”.

Thorny ties

Since Yunus assumed charge in Dhaka, New Delhi has shown little interest in engaging with the interim government and has been non-responsive towards Yunus’ so-called overtures to refashion ties. Bangladesh’s polarised domestic politics and the condition of the Hindus there did not help the case either.

Yunus’ insistent demand that India should send Sheikh Hasina back to Bangladesh to face trial, has widened the hiatus between the two countries. However, Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi did meet during the recently concluded BIMSTEC summit in Thailand. This was a surprising development as no bilateral meeting was planned before this  meeting.

The meeting did not work to assuage New Delhi’s concerns. Within a few days of Yunus’ comment on India’s northeast, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs terminated a five-year-old arrangement which allowed Bangladesh to route its export cargo to countries through Indian Land Customs Stations and onward to ports and airports. This may hit Bangladeshi traders as it will compound cost and time for the goods they exported using the land route to Nepal and Bhutan.

Immediately after the Yunus-Modi meeting, India’s Ministry of External Affairs said it hoped that the Bangladesh government “will take strong action” against those responsible for committing atrocities against the minority Hindus. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar drove home the point – on Yunus’ remark on India’s northeast – that “cooperation is an integrated outlook”, and not “subject to cherry picking”. His point was that Bangladesh could not raise issues that only suited it.

The Bangladesh-China bonhomie aims to push for new dynamics in South Asia. It is reported that Pakistani leaders are also planning to visit Dhaka soon. The foreign secretary of Pakistan reached Dhaka on April 17. This will be the first visit of a Pakistani official to Dhaka since 2012. This certainly underscores Islamabad’s diplomatic manoeuvre to capitalise on the growing anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh’s increasing tilt towards China will be a challenge to India’s economic security as well as diplomatic objectives. The growing Bangladesh-Pakistan warmth will further complicate the situation for India.

India has been cautiously watching large-scale infrastructure developments undertaken by China under the BRI in its neighbourhood, which have led to major debt trap challenges in some of those countries. These setbacks will add to existing security concerns involving the Hambantota and Gwadar ports, where the Chinese have considerable interests. At the same time, a redeveloped airbase close to India’s eastern flank will only deepen New Delhi’s woes.

(Published under Creative Commons from 360info™. Read the original article here)