India’s Pak Dilemma: Caught Between Public Outrage & Perilous Escalation

The devastating terrorist attack on April 22, 2025, in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir, has once again pushed India to the brink, compelling it to seriously consider various options for retaliating against Pakistan.

The terrorist attack resulted in the deaths of 26 tourists, marking it as the deadliest such incident in Kashmir since the attack on security forces in Pulwama in 2019. India has blamed Pakistan for the outrageous attack.

This tragedy has ignited a powerful wave of public anger across India, exerting pressure on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government to respond decisively. Modi has vowed severe repercussions for perpetrators and their supporters, raising public expectations of a robust military action.

Lessons from Uri and Balakot

The current scenario strongly parallels past incidents. After the Uri attack in 2016, India launched surgical strikes on terrorist launch pads in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Similarly, following the Pulwama bombing in 2019, India executed airstrikes in Balakot inside Pakistan.

These operations were intentionally limited, aiming to punish without triggering a full-scale war. Nevertheless, Pakistan managed to neutralise these actions effectively.

Post-Uri, Islamabad denied that India had conducted any surgical strike. Following Balakot, Pakistan promptly responded with retaliatory airstrikes, capturing an Indian pilot.

Both incidents failed to achieve lasting deterrence, underscored by subsequent low-profile terrorist attacks every year in Jammu and Kashmir.

These historical precedents illustrate a critical strategic shortfall: India’s retaliatory measures have temporarily satisfied domestic demands but have failed to change Pakistan’s strategic calculus or deter future terrorist attacks.

The government faces the formidable challenge of balancing public demand for immediate retaliation with the dangers of uncontrolled escalation against nuclear-armed Pakistan.

Public sentiment-driven responses risk being reactive, inadequately planned, and potentially self-defeating, highlighting the inherent risks of impulsive military action post-Pahalgam.

The illusion of power asymmetry

Although India possesses conventional military superiority, this advantage is largely negated by Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent capability.

India’s “No First Use” nuclear doctrine contrasts sharply with Pakistan’s explicit threats to use tactical nuclear weapons against any significant conventional Indian advance.

Military actions by India that threaten Pakistan’s core interests inherently risk nuclear escalation.

Pakistani officials have explicitly warned of severe consequences, including nuclear retaliation, if India attempts aggressive measures such as manipulating water resources under the Indus Waters Treaty.

Practically, India’s conventional superiority offers little advantage in an India-Pakistani conflict.

Despite doctrines like Cold Start, designed for limited warfare below the nuclear threshold, ambiguous nuclear red lines significantly increase the risk of miscalculations.

Consequently, Pakistan’s nuclear capability effectively neutralises India’s conventional edge, making a decisive Indian victory unlikely.

Is Pakistan provoking a military response?

There is a plausible concern that Pakistan might be deliberately provoking India into military retaliation.

Historically viewed as the aggressor, Pakistan now has an opportunity to reshape this narrative. Pakistani officials swiftly denied involvement in the Pahalgam attack, framing it as a possible “false flag” operation by India.

Should India retaliate militarily, Pakistan could portray itself as the victim, shifting international attention away from its sponsorship of terrorism to India’s aggression.

The Pakistani leadership, including Army Chief General Asim Munir, has recently used inflammatory rhetoric about Kashmir, potentially provoking India into an escalatory response.

A military strike by India, executed without clear objectives, could inadvertently reinforce Pakistan’s strategic narrative, rally domestic support, and garner international sympathy.

The risks of stalemate

A crucial problem India faces in retaliatory military action is defining “victory.”

Pakistan’s military strategy since its traumatic defeat in 1971 has focused on denying India clear victories, instead framing stalemates as wins. This narrative was evident after the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2019 Balakot strikes, where Pakistan portrayed resilience as victory despite setbacks.

Any limited military strike that lacks decisive outcomes would likely be portrayed by Pakistan as a strategic victory, bolstering morale and strengthening the military’s domestic narrative.

Thus, India faces a high threshold for strategic success, as anything less than a clear victory could reinforce Pakistan’s position and encourage future provocations.

A crucial aspect frequently neglected in Indian strategic considerations is the clear articulation of political objectives behind military or diplomatic actions.

India must explicitly outline whether its objectives are punitive, deterrent, or aimed at dismantling specific terrorist infrastructures to ensure coherent strategy execution and effective international communication.

Diplomatic and economic retaliation: Temporary solutions

India’s immediate post-Pahalgam response has been aggressive yet ad hoc, including the closure of the Wagah border, expulsion of Pakistani diplomats, suspension of special visas, and threats to revoke the Indus Waters Treaty.

These measures aim to pacify public outrage and signal India’s seriousness. However, they lack a clear strategic direction, appearing more as temporary reactions than long-term solutions.

Halting water flows, for instance, risks humanitarian crises and lengthy infrastructure projects, making it an unlikely sustainable strategy.

Pakistan’s aggressive response to these threats further complicates the situation, pushing India closer to a critical decision regarding a military response. The long-term effectiveness of these punitive measures remains uncertain without significant international backing.

Escalation without a safety net

Compounding India’s dilemma is the significantly altered geopolitical environment.

Historically, the United States and other major powers mediated crises between India and Pakistan, preventing escalation into full-scale war.

However, the current global landscape under U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed term reflects reduced international engagement, with America showing reluctance for active mediation despite its rhetorical support for India.

Other international actors—China and the Gulf states—either lean towards Pakistan or lack the leverage to mediate effectively.

Consequently, escalation management now relies heavily on the prudence of both India and Pakistan, a risky prospect given domestic pressures and nationalist fervour on both sides.

Military conflict without defined objectives risks strategic failure, strengthens Pakistan’s narrative of resilience, and may escalate into a nuclear confrontation. Therefore, a nuanced and restrained approach emphasising diplomacy, targeted countermeasures, and international collaboration is essential.

With diminished international mediation, miscalculations or unintended escalations are more likely, making any conflict potentially harder to resolve than in previous confrontations.

Navigating strategic complexity

India must recognise the complexities in managing its response to the Pahalgam attack.

Strategic patience is vital, as impulsive military action could lead to dire consequences without clear benefits.

Instead, India should intensify intelligence operations to dismantle terrorist networks, alongside vigorous diplomatic engagement and efforts to strengthen international coalitions to isolate Pakistan diplomatically.

Military conflict without defined objectives risks strategic failure, strengthens Pakistan’s narrative of resilience, and may escalate into a nuclear confrontation.

(Published under Creative Commons from 360info™. Read the original article here)