Why South Asian Militaries Need To Reduce Their Carbon Footprint
South Asian militaries must understand their role in dealing with climate change (Defence Research and Development Organisation)
Militaries, which are among the biggest consumers of fuel, account for 5.5 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.
If the world’s militaries were a country, they would have the fourth-highest carbon footprint after China, USA and India.
The US Air Force’s F-35 fighter jets emit as much CO2 as an average UK petrol car does in one year for every 100 nautical miles flown.
With 750 bases worldwide, the US military’s emissions are the largest, rivaling the entire annual output of smaller nations like Portugal and Denmark.
Although India is among the top three emitters of greenhouse gases, its emission index per military person is low.
While the G20 countries are jointly responsible for 80 percent of global emissions, South Asia with 25 percent of the global population is responsible for nine to 10 percent with India alone accounting for seven percent. Bangladesh and Pakistan have been collectively responsible for less than 1.5 percent.
Despite having the largest armed forces in the world, South Asia is responsible for marginal climate damages due to military operations.
However, South Asia is also at the worst end of the global warming spectrum. Unfortunately, the region receives the lowest funding in climate adaptation financing.
South Asia is in a unique position to claim its rightful reparation from the rich world for implementing UN-mandated Climate Action goals. Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, along with Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives need to begin a region-wide dialogue on climate adaptation and mitigation.
South Asian militaries can play an important role in dealing with climate change in the region. However, that will need some underlying realities to be accepted by both the political and military leaders of the region.
First, they need to realise that climate security is not a zero-sum game like military security. A rise in temperatures due to CO2 emissions over Bangladesh will spill over into neighbouring India as well and vice versa. Therefore, climate security has to be seen as a “regional security threat” rather than a “security issue”.
Second, climate security permeates into other security areas. Migration caused by sea-level rise, for example, shows that the issue of climate security is structurally linked with political, social and economic security.
Compared to the global average, the Indian Ocean is warming faster than other seas. Between 10-50 million people may be threatened by rising sea levels in South Asia by 2100. South Asia, therefore, has no choice but to accept climate change as a regional existential threat.
Third, the militaries of South Asia have to learn to cooperate with one another as the need for climate security impels them to do so. It could prove fatal for South Asian countries to see climate change through the lens of an isolated national perspective.
Climate phenomena and concerns are so interlinked that the localised environmental insecurities of an individual nation cannot be reasonably analysed and resolved without taking others in the region into account.
Therefore, the South Asian militaries which have a stake in climate change must include “Climate Science” as part of their academic curriculum.
South Asian militaries can follow NATO, which as a regional military organisation, has announced its goal of being a net-zero organisation by 2050. The first thing the military planners should do is to form a regional climate-security nexus as part of their national interest. This should include military organisations, the defence industry, the civil sector and academia.
The cardinal principle for the mitigation and reduction of their carbon footprints by the South Asian militaries must be based on the understanding of their functional and geographic role, and accompanied by capacity building to deal with climate change as an existential threat. There needs to be recognition that this has to be done cooperatively.
South Asian militaries should learn from the climate impact of wars taking place currently in the world.
In October 2023 alone, for example, the Israeli aerial bombardment of 25,000 tons of munitions on Gaza was equivalent to twice the explosive force of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima during World War II.
In its first three years from 2022-2025, the Russo-Ukraine war caused the dumping of an estimated 230 million tons of CO2 into the atmosphere.
This is equal to the cumulative carbon emissions of five countries classified as Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) on the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) Emergency Watchlist: Haiti, Syria, Burkina Faso, Yemen and Somalia.
No wonder then that scientists and other climate experts have raised the alarm about the “military black hole” in the global emission counting.
For years, the military’s role in coming to the aid of civil power in fighting climate-related disasters has proved necessary and vital in saving human lives and property. If climate change is estimated as a risk multiplier, it should be integrated into the military’s risk models.
It should become imperative for South Asian militaries working in partnership with each other to build a comprehensive view of mitigation and adaptation programmes by adopting a regional climate security strategy.
Cyclone Bhola in the then East Pakistan cost between 300,000 and 500,000 human lives. It is well known that the apathetic indifference to the climate catastrophe brought about the disintegration of Pakistan, and Bangladesh was born.
The Bhola tragedy has left a stark lesson that the failure to respond to climate change effectively at the state level can have adverse impacts on the political security of a region.
(Published under Creative Commons from 360info™. Read the original article here)
