The Gaza Ceasefire Is Dead − Israeli Domestic Politics Killed It

The ceasefire in Gaza appears to be over.

And while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sought to blame Hamas for the resumption of fighting that killed more than 400 Palestinians on March 18, 2025 – “only the beginning,” Netanyahu warned – the truth is the seeds of the renewed violence are to be found in Israeli domestic politics.

Ever since the first phase of the ceasefire came into effect in January, Israeli politics experts – myself included – have flagged a likely insurmountable problem. And that is the execution of the plan’s second phase – which, if implemented, would see full withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of the remaining hostages – is a nonstarter for far-right elements in the Israeli ruling coalition that Netanyahu relies on for his political survival.

Withdrawing from the Gaza Strip runs counter to the maximalist ideologies of key members of Netanyahu’s government, including some in his own party, Likud. Rather, their stated position is for Israel to remain in control of the enclave and to push as many Palestinians as possible out of it. It is why many in Netanyahu’s government cheered when President Donald Trump indicated that Palestinians should be cleared from Gaza to make way for a massive reconstruction project led by the United States.

As an expert on Israeli history and a professor of peace studies, I believe the far-right vision for post-conflict Gaza shared by parts of Netanyahu’s government is incompatible with the ceasefire plan. But increasingly, it appears to chime with the views of some in the U.S. administration – which, as de facto sponsor of the ceasefire, may have been the only entity that could have held the Israeli government to its terms.

Efforts to transform judiciary

It is true Hamas is responsible for delays and manipulations during the first phase of the ceasefire deal. It also turned hostage releases into propaganda spectacles, tormenting both the families of captives and much of Israeli society in the process.

But in my view, the resumption of war is first and foremost tied to domestic Israeli currents that predate even the Oct. 7, 2023, attack that sparked the deadliest fighting between Israelis and Palestinians since the 1948 war. It can be traced back to Netanyahu’s efforts to transform the political system in Israel and increase the power of the executive and legislative branches while weakening the judiciary.

Since coming to power in January 2023, Netanyahu’s hard-right government has made significant efforts to turn independent institutions such as the attorney general’s office and the police into compliant arms of the government by seeking to place government loyalists in charge of both.

Prolonging the war

In 2023, a sustained and massive protest movement slowed Netanyahu’s attempts to overhaul the country’s judiciary.

And then came the Hamas massacre on Oct. 7.

Many Israeli commentators hoped that the attack would force the government to reconsider its efforts to carry out what some described as a legal coup, in a show of national unity.

But Netanyahu and his government had other plans.

After an initial hostage deal in November 2023 failed to yield a wider breakthrough, people gradually began to question whether Netanyahu’s primary interest was to prolong the war in the belief that doing so might be the best way to save his political career and revive his assault on the judiciary.

Such a view has solid foundations. Having been indicted in November 2019 on breach of trust, fraud and corruption charges, Netanyahu was presented with an opportunity to muddy the logic of the long-running legal proceedings: He could hardy stand trial while defending a nation at war. The prosecution is still ongoing, but the resumption of fighting has, again, meant that Netanyahu has reason to delay his testimony.

Meanwhile, war also provides cover for Netanyahu to neuter some of his fiercest critics. In the months after the Oct. 7 attack, Netanyahu systematically removed from office antagonistic members of the security and political leadership, accusing them of being responsible either for the Hamas attack or for the mismanagement of the conflict.

This purging of anti-Netanyahu elements in Israel has ramped up in recent months, with Netanyahu and his allies seeking to replace Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara and fire Ronen Bar, the head of the powerful security agency Shabak, or Shin Bet, which has been carrying out sensitive investigations into Netanyahu’s closest aides.

Shoring up the coalition

The apparent breakdown of the ceasefire now also coincides with growing pressure on Netanyahu from the political right in his ruling coalition.

Under Israeli law, the government must approve its annual budget by the end of March or face being dissolved, something that would trigger fresh elections.

But Netanyahu is facing holdouts among ultra-Orthodox parties over the issue of army drafts. Since the start of the war, there has been tremendous pressure from the wider Israeli public to end the draft exemption for ultra-Orthodox men, who unlike other Israelis did not have to serve in the military. Ultra-Orthodox parties, however, are demanding the opposite: to pass legislation that would formally exempt them from military service.

To secure the vote for the annual budget and stave off elections, Netanyahu needs support – and if it isn’t going to come from the ultra-Orthodox parties, then he needs to shore up far-right members of the coalition.

As a result of the resumption of war, Otzma Yehudit – the far-right party that left Netanyahu’s government in January to protest the ceasefire agreement – has returned to the fold. This gives Netanyahu crucial budget votes. But in effect, it signals that the coalition has no intention of implementing the second phase of the ceasefire plan, withdrawing from Gaza. In effect, it has killed the ceasefire.

The domestic politics of Israel alone is not to blame for the resumption of fighting. There is, too, the changing stance of the U.S. administration.

The transition of presidency from Joe Biden to Donald Trump was a decisive reason for the timing of the ceasefire agreement in January 2025.

But it appears that the administration is reluctant to force Netanyahu to continue to the second phase. Recent statements from Trump suggest that he supports putting extra military pressure on Hamas in Gaza. And by blaming Hamas for the resumption of the war, Trump is tacitly endorsing the position of the Israeli government.

Hamas, in fact, has the most interest in implementing the agreement. Doing so would give the Palestinian militant group the best chance it has of remaining in control of Gaza, while also boasting that it had been responsible for the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons.

Protests gaining momentum

The majority of Israelis are in favor of ending the war, completing the ceasefire agreement and having Netanyahu resign.

And the anti-government protest movement is gaining steam again as seen in widespread protests in Israeli cities against both the resumption of fighting in Gaza and the attempt to oust security chief Ronen Bar.

Given that the people and the government of Israel appear to be pulling in opposite directions, the resumption of bombing in Gaza can only exacerbate the internal crisis that preceded the war and has ebbed and flowed ever since.

But Netanyahu has seemingly bet that more war is his best chance of remaining in power and completing his plan to transform the country’s political system. Israel is facing an unprecedented situation in which, I would argue, its own prime minister has became the biggest threat to the country’s stability.

(Published under Creative Commons from The Conversation. Read the original article here)