India’s Indus Waters Bargain Needs A Cohesive Strategy, Not Coercion

While the Indus Waters Treaty has survived three India-Pakistan wars, the pattern of interaction between the two countries on sharing the waters of the Indus Basin has been conflictual rather than cooperative.

As the conflict escalates post Operation Sindoor, it is pertinent how India recalibrates the link between water and terrorism.

Some claim India has weaponised the Indus Waters Treaty by putting it in ‘abeyance’, an action that can have regional ramifications.
There are also claims that India will now expedite projects on both the western and eastern rivers of the Indus system and that putting the treaty in abeyance can be seen as a political signal rather than legally enforceable action.

Rivers, however, can be actors with agency and not mere pawns in a bargaining game. Climate change, water scarcity, deteriorating quality of the springs that feed the basin and melting glaciers are significantly overlooked in the Indus Waters Treaty.

The treaty perhaps needs to take these factors into account for its future survival. However, its survival itself may now be in doubt.

Pakistan depends on the Indus system for almost 80 percent of its total irrigation water requirement. No legal groundwater framework binds India and Pakistan and this has impacted nutrition security in both Indian and Pakistani Punjab.

Up to now, India undertook projects permitted by the treaty, using water to which it was legally entitled. After the Pahalgam attack, India can claim that it is not accountable to Pakistan for any project it initiates in the Indus Basin. This will create uncertainties for Pakistan.

Post-Pahalgam, the fast-tracking of five hydel projects in Jammu and Kashmir has raised concerns about the securitisation of rivers and the neglect of environmental clearances, potentially harming the geological landscape and disrupting the hydrological regime.

These projects are: the 800-Megawatt (MW) Bursar, 260-MW Dulhasti II, 1856-MW Swalkote, 240-MW Uri Stage II, and 930-MW Kirthai II. Uri II faced delays due to objections from Pakistan in 2010.

Putting the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance also highlights New Delhi’s frustration with several run-of-the-river projects: Kishanganga, Baglihar, Ratle, and Tulbul, which were stalled in the past by Pakistan.

With the Treaty on hold, India also does not have to share hydrological data or flood information with Pakistan and can withhold critical details regarding exceptional reservoir discharges and flood flows.

Pakistan has responded to Indian action by announcing that it will target any structures built on the Indus River that violate the treaty.

Will these actions lead to conflict escalation? Two scenarios emerge.

First, in the face of Pakistan’s refusal to admit to and curtail terrorism directed at it, India might scale up the conflict, and develop a legal case for the material breach citing past practices of Pakistan where the Dispute Resolution Mechanism was not respected. This was done in January 2023. Second, if the situation escalates, New Delhi can spin the narrative to leverage the situation, claiming that the treaty in its current form is unacceptable and needs modification.

However, will India succeed and will Pakistan relent?

First, Pakistan’s politics is dominated by the Army. Its Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, also known as Hafiz-e-Quran (someone who has memorised the entire Islamic holy book), has of late been emphasising Pakistan’s Islamic identity on both international and domestic fronts. His statements leave little room for improved relations at least for now.

Second, Kashmir is often described by Pakistan as its jugular vein, referring to its strategic importance as the country’s weakest point, as also the source of its water and a Muslim-majority region, which it believes should have been a part of its territory after the Partition. Any renegotiating of the Indus Waters Treaty would disrupt this narrative and weaken it by admitting India’s right over J&K and the use of its rivers.

Third, acknowledging a link between water and terrorism challenges Pakistan’s portrayal as a victim of terrorism and its distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terrorists. Any effort by Pakistan to moderate its stance would suggest that it has previously supported terrorism in India, a claim it has publicly rejected.

Given the complexity of the challenges, a more dynamic solution is needed.

A networked response that weaves geo-strategy with geo-ecology could offer an alternate perspective. A networked approach addresses geological sensibilities, aiming to position the ecosystem as a hub for the engagement of various actors. Local people and communities become important nodes in this engagement, where knowledge systems and interests can create new configurations.

Scientific data and affected ecosystems can also be considered allies in this framework.  Geological sensibilities suggest that nature has agency and should be recognised.

India’s primary objective should be establishing a holistic set of actions to shape the Indus system, while also combating terrorism and ecological degradation.

Rivers significantly influence the environmental landscape of the Himalayas and are not merely resources to be exploited. Recognising this, one needs to take note of the geological and ecological fault lines of the Indus Basin.

The Indus Basin is prone to significant seismic risks affecting water infrastructure, including dams, barrages, and the Indus system. It also experiences considerable sediment erosion, which can influence hydrological regimes and groundwater quality, which may be disrupted if surface water infrastructure does not consider groundwater aquifers.

An adaptive strategy that views the Indus Basin as a network of rivers, sediments, wetlands, aquifers and biodiversity must be prioritised. The ecosystem should serve as the hub for gathering information, where the Kashmiri voice and agency are equally important.

Thus, positioning Kashmir as the central stakeholder, while balancing ecological, national security and local development needs, is essential.

Critical steps may include reviving traditional knowledge, understanding disaster risk exposure, and addressing the vulnerabilities of horticulturalists and fishing communities.

Contrary to the logic of weaponisation and securitisation, discussions around water governance reforms on the eastern and western rivers of the Indus Basin are also needed. Problematising the current nature-politics divide is important.

In the long run, this will help address complex problems in a non-linear manner, rather than relying on coercive tactics, which may offer tactical advantage but risk alienating moderate voices over time.

(Published under Creative Commons from 360info™. Read the original article here)