Bangladesh’s Exclusionary Election & Its Tryst With Democratic Renewal

Bangladesh has entered a decisive and unusually precarious phase in its long struggle toward democratic consolidation. As the country approaches a national election scheduled for February 12, the political landscape has shifted in ways that raise serious questions about electoral neutrality, political inclusion and the state’s ideological direction.

What initially appeared as an uncertain transitional moment has evolved into a more structured yet deeply troubling political configuration. The Muhammad Yunus-led interim government’s conduct increasingly suggests selective accommodation of certain political actors, while others remain excluded or constrained. As a result, the administration no longer functions as a neutral caretaker authority but as a contested transitional power whose decisions risk shaping—rather than merely administering—the electoral outcome.

The return from exile of Tarique Rahman, chairperson of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), remains politically significant. His prolonged absence had weakened the party’s organisational coherence and strategic direction. For many supporters, his re-emergence symbolised the possibility of restoring political balance after years of marginalisation.

Yet, as the electoral calendar advances, it has become evident that leadership symbolism alone cannot address a structurally skewed political environment. While the BNP has re-emerged as an active and visible political force, the broader rules of political competition are increasingly being recalibrated by interim authorities whose neutrality is under question. Leadership presence, however significant, cannot substitute for an even playing field or for institutional arrangements that guarantee credible electoral fairness.

A growing concern in the current transitional phase is not one of overt partisanship, but of quiet asymmetry. The interim government’s conduct increasingly suggests a delicate accommodation of Jamaat-e-Islami—expressed less through explicit endorsement than through patterns of tolerance, access and regulatory discretion. These signals are subtle, often deniable, and therefore difficult to contest, yet they are politically consequential.

In a genuinely inclusive democratic transition, neutrality is measured not only by formal declarations but by the consistency of institutional behaviour. When one major mainstream party—the Awami League—remains effectively excluded from electoral participation, even modest differentials in treatment can generate disproportionate political advantage. Under such conditions, the electoral field risks being shaped through indirect calibration rather than open competition.

The implications extend beyond electoral arithmetic. Subtle institutional favouring, when sustained, can gradually reorient the ideological balance of the political system, influencing which actors are normalised, empowered or marginalised. In this sense, the concern is not simply about fairness in a single election, but about the longer-term trajectory of the state’s democratic and ideological equilibrium.

Distorted pluralism?

The Jamaat-e-Islami’s expanding visibility must be understood in context. In normal democratic conditions, ideological competition—including religiously inspired politics—falls within the bounds of pluralism. But pluralism presupposes symmetry. When competition unfolds in the absence of a major secular party and under an interim authority of questionable neutrality, it produces distorted pluralism, not democratic diversity.

This distortion carries long-term consequences. It weakens democratic legitimacy, marginalises moderate political forces, and risks normalising the political influence of actors whose historical relationship with democratic norms and minority rights has been deeply contested.

The continued exclusion of the Awami League from the electoral process remains a foundational democratic deficit. Elections lacking participation from all major political stakeholders—regardless of past governance failures—cannot command broad legitimacy, either domestically or internationally.

These concerns are amplified by persistent political violence, intimidation and inconsistent application of the rule of law. Law enforcement appears reactive rather than impartial, contributing to public mistrust and political anxiety. Under such conditions, elections risk becoming procedural events rather than expressions of popular sovereignty.

There is also an emerging concern that instability itself may be invoked—explicitly or implicitly—as justification for post-election manoeuvring, delays or contested outcomes. Any such trajectory would further erode public confidence and deepen democratic regression.

In this fragile environment, the BNP occupies a pivotal but uncomfortable position. As the most prominent party actively contesting the election, it faces a responsibility that extends beyond electoral arithmetic. Silence or acquiescence in the face of exclusion and ideological skew would risk conferring legitimacy on a flawed process.

Conversely, a principled insistence on inclusivity, institutional neutrality and electoral fairness—even when politically inconvenient—could establish a vital democratic benchmark. Such a stance would not guarantee immediate success, but it would anchor the party’s legitimacy in democratic norms rather than tactical advantage.

Bangladesh’s transition continues to unfold under the watchful eyes of international stakeholders. The US and India, in particular, retain significant strategic influence. Their engagement, however, has thus far appeared cautious, pragmatic and at times ambiguous.

Uncertain stability

While stability remains a legitimate concern, stability divorced from democratic legitimacy is inherently fragile. External actors face a delicate challenge: encouraging a credible electoral process without appearing to endorse selective inclusion or ideological bias. Silence, in this context, risks being interpreted as acquiescence.

The consequences for Bangladesh’s democratic trajectory extend beyond its borders. A credible, inclusive election would contribute to regional stability, economic confidence and cooperative security in South Asia. Conversely, a contested or ideologically skewed transition risks generating long-term instability, discouraging investment, and complicating regional diplomacy.

Bangladesh’s development gains—hard-won over decades—remain vulnerable to political disruption. Democratic credibility is not a luxury; it is a prerequisite for sustainable economic progress.

As the election approaches, Bangladesh stands not merely at an electoral juncture, but at a moment of profound uncertainty about the very foundations of political stability. A central unanswered question is whether an election conducted in the continued absence of the Awami League can realistically deliver durable legitimacy—or whether excluding a major political force will inevitably deepen instability rather than resolve it.

This uncertainty is further compounded by the Awami League’s public call on its supporters and on citizens more broadly to refrain from voting, a development that raises the likelihood of depressed turnout and uneven participation, thereby complicating claims of popular mandate.

Equally uncertain is the post-election law and order environment. Elections held amid fragmented participation and uneven political accommodation often resolve procedural timelines without addressing underlying political tensions. In such circumstances, the period following the vote may prove more destabilising than the campaign itself, particularly if segments of society perceive the outcome as structurally predetermined rather than competitively earned.

Finally, there remains no clear assurance that the eventual victor—whether the BNP or the Jamaat—will possess both the political authority and societal acceptance required to restore peace and govern inclusively. Electoral victory alone does not guarantee governability. Without broad-based legitimacy, institutional trust and cross-party accommodation, any incoming administration may struggle to consolidate order or prevent renewed cycles of contestation.

What is therefore at stake is not simply who forms the next government, but whether the electoral process can produce a settlement capable of stabilising the country rather than postponing conflict. The decisions taken by domestic political actors, and the posture adopted by international partners in the final phase of this transition, will shape whether this election marks a step toward democratic renewal—or another unresolved passage in Bangladesh’s long struggle with contested legitimacy.